Keystone is an open-source project for building customizable trusted execution environments (TEEs) based on RISC-V for various platforms and use cases. Our goal is to build a secure and trustworthy open-source secure hardware enclave, which can be applied to a wide range of applications and devices.
See our latest paper (EuroSys’20) to get more details!
[arXiv (2020)] Schneider et al., “PIE: A Dynamic TCB for Remote Systems with a Platform Isolation Environment”
[arXiv (2020)] Yu et al., “Elasticlave: An Efficient Memory Model for Enclaves”
[IEEE Access Volume 8 (2020)] Hoang et al., “Quick Boot of Trusted Execution Environment With Hardware Accelerators”
[WOOT’20] Roy et al., “When Oblivious is Not: Attacks against OPAM”
[CARRV’20] Andrade et al, “Software-Based Off-Chip Memory Protection for RISC-V Trusted Execution Environments”
[CCS’19] Bulck et al., “A Tale of Two Worlds: Assessing the Vulnerability of Enclave Shielding Runtimes”
[SOSP’19] Nelson et al., “Scaling Symbolic Evaluation for Automated Verification of Systems Code with Serval”
[RISC-V Summit’20] Manuel Offenberg from Seagate features a prototype based on Keystone
If you want any updates in the list, please email dayeol [at] berkeley [dot] edu. If you’re an academic user, please cite Keystone Enclave using the following bibtex:
@inproceedings{lee2019keystone,
title={Keystone: An Open Framework for Architecting Trusted Execution Environments},
author={Dayeol Lee and David Kohlbrenner and Shweta Shinde and Krste Asanovic and Dawn Song},
year={2020},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fifteenth European Conference on Computer Systems},
series = {EuroSys ’20}
}
Contributors to the project repositories