Keystone Paper and Customizable TEEs

We’re happy to announce the release of the Keystone paper! The current version is now available on the Keystone website here.

We’ll be running a multi-part blog series covering different aspects of the paper. The first installment will cover the customizable TEE model that Keystone provides.

Customizable TEEs

We believe the right way to build Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) is open-source with highly flexible, and minimal primitives that present clear abstractions.

Need for Customizable TEEs

ARM TrustZone and Intel SGX are the widely available Implementations today. We take some valuable lessons we learned from these existing standard TEEs as an inspiration. Specifically, all these TEEs make fixed design-decisions based on either the target applications (e.g., crypto libraries, client apps, server apps, embedded apps) or threat models (e.g., remote adversary, side-channel adversary).

Although these TEEs do meet the requirements of the workloads and use-cases they were designed for, the proliferation of TEEs and need for secure computation has led to a wave of repurposing these TEEs to adapt to a different set of workloads (e.g., Intel SGX is now being used for server-side deployments). Further, both academia and industry are putting in a lot of effort towards adding more support for flexible application porting to TEEs, better defenses against side-channels, performance optimizations, repurposing existing hardware features to improve the security of TEE-bound applications.

TEEs have not previously been designed with the goal of maintaining flexibility for enclave-developers nor extensibility if and when a new hardware feature becomes available. Further, reducing the enclave TCB has been a Long-standing objective for all TEE platforms to varying degrees of success.

Finally, serious third-party evaluation of the security of TEEs has not been possible with closed-source hardware and microcode implementations.

To this end, when designing the open-source Keystone, we considered flexibility, customizability, and TCB minimization as the main guiding principles. We have developed clear abstractions and a modular programming model which made it significantly easier to realize our goals and for others to contribute.

Defining a Customizable TEE

We define three logical actors involved in the customizable TEE ecosystem: the manufacturer (who build the hardware), the platform provider (who operates the hardware, eg. a cloud provider), and the enclave developer (who writes software that they run in enclaves).

In a customizable TEE, in contrast to a standard TEE, the security guarantees provided and features enabled are a combination of decisions by all 3 actors. This is analogous to the differences between classical networking hardware and Software Defined Networking (SDN). The switch to a minimal easily reconfigurable hardware layer, with a programmable software layer performing the majority of the work leads to a far more agile system.

We believe this will accelerate research in the area as well as make for safer deployments with faster updates.

The Keystone Framework provides customizable TEEs by using standard RISC-V hardware for flexibility along with multiple software layers to ensure minimal TCBs and maximum enclave capability.

Keystone and Customization

In a Keystone compatible platform, there are no modifications needed to the RISC-V cores. Any available additional features the SoC or peripherals supply are handled by plugins to the Keystone SM. These may be developed by the manufacturer, or the platform provider, who determines what specific set to include in the deployed platform. These decisions are not permanent and may be changed by compiling a new SM and installing it.

Above this layer, each enclave may deploy its own customized runtime binary. We maintain the Eyrie modular runtime, which supports a growing set of use-cases while minimizing the code present in the TCB.

Existing frameworks, defenses, enhancements, etc. to other TEE systems are generally portable to Keystone. Secure filesystems and other safe I/O operations can be integrated directly into the runtime, without affecting the enclave application itself.

We are excited to see what the community brings to the Keystone Framework!

Keystone v0.3 Release

Keystone is now on v0.3 with new features, plugin systems, and more documentation.

OSEW 2019

Summary of the Open-Source Enclaves Workshop on July 25th 2019

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